Interest rate policy and the inflation scare problem: 1979-1992 by Marvin Goodfriend
       





monetary policy since the late 1970s is unique in the post-
Korean War era in that rising inﬂation has been reversed and
stabilized at a lower rate for almost a decade. The current in-
ﬂation rate of 3 to 4 percent per year, representing a reduction of 6 percent or
so from its 1981 peak, is the result of a disinﬂationary effort that has been long
and difﬁcult.
This article analyzes the disinﬂation by reviewing the interaction between
Federal Reserve policy actions and economic variables such as the long-term
bond rate, real GDP growth, and inﬂation. The period breaks naturally into
a number of phases, with the broad contour of events as follows. A period
of rising inﬂation was followed by disinﬂation which, strictly speaking, was
largely completed in 1983 when inﬂation stabilized at around 4 percent per
year. But there were two more “inﬂation scares” later in the decade when ris-
ing long-term rates reﬂected expectations that the Fed might once more allow
inﬂation to rise. Conﬁdence in the Fed was still relatively low in 1983, but the
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central bank has acquired more credibility since then by successfully resisting
the inﬂation scares.
I analyze the conduct of monetary policy using a narrative approach that
pays close attention to monthly movements of long- and short-term interest
rates. My approach is intended to complement existing studies such as the
VAR-based analyses by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992), and
the more conventional studies of the period by Friedman (1988) and Poole
(1988). The goal is to distill observations to guide future analysis of monetary
policy with the ultimate objective of improving macroeconomic performance.
Based on a familiarity with the Fed and the work of Fed economists, I interpret
policy actions in terms of the federal funds rate rather than a measure of money.
I view the article as a case study of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate policy.
The Fed’s primary policy problem during the period under study was the
acquisition and maintenance of credibility for its commitment to low inﬂation.1
I measure credibility by movements of inﬂation expectations reﬂected in the
long-term interest rate. For much of the period the Fed’s policy actions were
directed at resisting inﬂation scares signaled by large sustained increases in the
long rate. A scare could take well over a year of high real short-term interest
rates to contain. Moreover, just the threat of a scare appears to have made the
Fed tighten aggressively in one instance and probably made it more cautious
when pushing the funds rate down to encourage real growth on a number of
occasions.
Inﬂation scares are costly because resisting them requires the Fed to raise
real short rates with potentially depressing effects on business conditions. Hes-
itating to react is also costly, however, because by revealing its indifference
to higher expected inﬂation the Fed actually encourages workers and ﬁrms to
ask for wage and price increases to protect themselves from higher expected
costs. The Fed is then inclined to accommodate the higher inﬂation with faster
money growth.
Inﬂation scares present the Fed with a fundamental dilemma the resolution
of which has decided the course of monetary policy in the postwar period.
Prior to the 1980s, the Fed generated an upward trend in the inﬂation rate by
reacting to inﬂation scares with a delay. The more prompt and even preemptive
reactions since the late 1970s have been a hallmark of the recent disinﬂation.
The plan of the article is as follows. First, I discuss the premises that
underlie my interpretation of monetary policy. A chronological analysis of pol-
icy follows. Finally, I summarize the main empirical ﬁndings in a series of
observations that sharpen our understanding of the conduct of monetary policy.
A brief summary concludes the article.
1 See Rogoff (1987) for a discussion of credibility, reputation, and monetary policy.    
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1. PREMISES UNDERLYING THE INTERPRETATION
OF POLICY
The ﬁrst step in any study of monetary history is to choose an indicator of the
stance of policy. For example, in their study of U.S. monetary history Friedman
and Schwartz (1963) focus on the monetary base (currency plus bank reserves)
because it summarizes monetary conditions whether or not a country is on
the gold standard and whether or not it has a central bank. Focusing on the
base allowed them to tie together a long period marked by many institutional
changes, making possible their famous empirical ﬁndings about money, prices,
and business conditions.
For my purposes, however, the base is not a useful indicator. Although the
Fed could have used the base as its instrument by controlling it closely in the
short run, it has not chosen to do so. Instead, the Fed has chosen to use the
federal funds rate as its policy instrument. Hence this study, which seeks to
investigate the short-run interactions between Fed policy and other economic
variables, interprets policy actions as changes in the federal funds rate. The
remainder of this section discusses the premises underlying my interpretation
of policy.
Interest Rate Targeting
Throughout its history the Fed’s policy instrument has been the federal funds
rate or its equivalent. At times, notably from the mid to late 1970s, it has
targeted the funds rate in a narrow band commonly 25 basis points wide (Cook
and Hahn 1989). More often, it has targeted the funds rate indirectly, using the
discount rate and borrowed reserve targets. Although the funds rate appears
noisier under borrowed reserve targeting than under direct funds rate targeting,
it is nevertheless tied relatively closely to a chosen funds rate target (Goodfriend
1983). Since a borrowing target tends to be associated with a particular spread
between the funds rate and the discount rate, targeting borrowed reserves lets
a discount rate adjustment feed through one-for-one to the funds rate. Forcing
banks to borrow more reserves at a given discount rate also raises the funds
rate (Goodfriend and Whelpley 1986). The Fed has used the borrowed reserve
procedure to help manage the funds rate since October 1982 (Wallich 1984;
Thornton 1988). Signiﬁcant funds rate movements since then should be viewed
as deliberate target changes.
It is less obvious that federal funds rate changes in the period of the New
Operating Procedures from October 1979 to October 1982 should be inter-
preted as deliberate. Under those procedures, the Fed was to ﬁx the path of
nonborrowed reserves available to depository institutions so that increases in
the money stock would force banks to borrow more reserves at the discount
window and thereby automatically drive up the funds rate and other short-term
interest rates.      
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Despite the widespread emphasis on automatic adjustment in the descrip-
tion of the post-October 1979 procedures, however, it was well recognized at the
time that movements in the funds rate would also result from purely judgmental
actions of the Federal Reserve (Levin and Meek 1981; Federal Reserve Bank
of New York 1982–1984). These actions included: (1) judgmental adjustments
to the nonborrowed reserve path taken at FOMC meetings that changed the
initially expected reserves banks would be forced to borrow at the discount
window (in effect, a funds rate target change by the FOMC), (2) judgmental
adjustments to the nonborrowed reserve path between FOMC meetings, (3)
changes in the discount rate, and (4) changes in the surcharge that at times
during the period was added to the basic discount rate charged to large banks.
Cook (1989) presents a detailed breakdown of policy actions affecting the
funds rate during this period showing that two-thirds of funds rate changes were
due to judgmental actions of the Fed and only one-third resulted from automatic
adjustment. Moreover, as we shall see below, the large funds rate movements
in the nonborrowed reserve targeting period are overwhelmingly attributable to
deliberate discretionary actions taken by the Fed to manage short-term interest
rates. Therefore, it is more accurate to refer to the period from October 1979
to October 1982 as one of aggressive federal funds rate targeting than one of
nonborrowed reserve targeting.
The Role of Money
The Federal Reserve was established with a mandate to cushion short-term
interest rates from liquidity disturbances. Between the Civil War and the cre-
ation of the Fed, such disturbances caused short rates to rise suddenly and
sharply from time to time. While generally trading in a range between 4 and
7 percent, the monthly average call loan rate reported by Macaulay (1938)
rose roughly 5 percentage points in one month on 26 occasions between 1865
and 1914. Moreover, as a result of banking crises, sudden changes of over 10
percentage points occurred eight times during the same period. These episodes
were distinctly temporary, ranging from one to four months, with many lasting
for no more than one month. Such extreme temporary spikes are absent from
interest rates since the founding of the Fed (Miron 1986; Mankiw, Miron, and
Weil 1987).
In line with its original mandate, the Fed has routinely accommodated
liquidity disturbances at a given targeted level of short-term interest rates.
Furthermore, by giving banks access to the discount window, the Fed has
been careful not to exert excessively disruptive liquidity disturbances when
changing its interest rate target.2 It follows that easing or tightening has mainly
2 Total reserve demand is not very sensitive to interest rates in the short run. So when-
ever the Fed cuts nonborrowed reserves to support a higher federal funds rate target, it allows
banks to satisfy a roughly unchanged reserve demand by borrowing the difference at the discount    
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been accomplished by changing the level of short rates to set in motion forces
slowing the growth of money demand in order to allow a future reduction in
money growth and inﬂation.
To view the Federal Reserve’s policy instrument as the federal funds rate
is thus to set money to the side, since at any point in time money demand is ac-
commodated at the going interest rate. This does not say, however, that money
can be left out of account altogether. The Fed, the markets, and economists
alike recognize that trend inﬂation is closely connected to trend money growth
and that achieving and maintaining price stability requires controlling money.
During the period under study, money growth was often viewed as an important
indicator of future inﬂation or disinﬂation by both the Fed and the markets.
Furthermore, we know from the work of McCallum (1981) and others that
an interest rate policy just describes how changes in interest rates correspond
to changes in the money stock. At a deeper level, then, there is an equivalence
between talking in terms of interest rates or money. The important difference is
that simple interest rate rules descriptive of policy have implications for how
money and prices actually evolve over time (Goodfriend 1987; Barro 1989).
We should keep this in mind when reviewing the current period for clues about
how policy inﬂuences the inﬂation rate. Ultimately we seek to understand what
it is about interest rate policy that turns one-time macroeconomic shocks into
highly persistent changes in the growth of money and prices.
Interpreting Co-Movements Between Short and Long Rates
The Fed targets the funds rate in order to stabilize inﬂation and real economic
growth as best it can. Output and prices, however, do not respond directly to
weekly federal funds rate movements but only to longer-term rates of perhaps
six months or more. Hence, the Fed targets the funds rate with the aim of
managing longer-term money market rates. It exercises its leverage as follows.
The market determines longer-term rates as the average expected level of the
funds rate over the relevant horizon (abstracting from a time varying term
premium and default risk). To see why, consider the pricing of a three-month
bank loan. A bank could fund the loan with a three-month CD, or it could plan
to borrow federal funds overnight for the next three months. Cost minimiza-
tion and competition among banks keep the CD rate in line with the average
expected future funds rate; competition in the loan market links loan rates to
the CD rate and expected future funds rates. Finally, arbitrage among holders
of money market securities links Treasury bill and commercial paper rates to
CD rates of similar maturity.
window. The negative relation between nonborrowed reserves and the funds rate in part reﬂects the
administration of the discount window, which creates a positive relation between bank borrowing
and the spread between the funds rate and the discount rate. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991)
emphasize the importance of this mechanism in understanding the liquidity effect.         
6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Since simplicity is crucial in communicating policy intentions, the Fed
tries to manage its funds rate target to maintain an expected constancy over
the near-term future. Target changes are highly persistent and seldom quickly
reversed, so that a target change carries the expected level of the funds rate
with it and thus longer-term money market rates too.3 In this way, interest rate
policy as practiced by the Fed anchors the short end of the term structure of
interest rates to the current federal funds rate.
By the above argument, the interest rate on long bonds also must be de-
termined as an average of expected future short rates. At best, the Fed affects
short-term real interest rates temporarily, so average future short rates over the
horizon of a 30-year bond should sum to a real interest rate that varies in a
range perhaps 1 or 2 percentage points around 3 percent per year plus the ex-
pected trend rate of inﬂation.4 From this perspective, we can view ﬂuctuations
in the long-term rate as driven by: (1) a component connected with the current
funds rate target that anchors short maturity rates and (2) a component driven
by expectations of inﬂation. Because the present discounted value of coupon
payments far out in the future is smaller at higher interest rates, we should
expect a given funds rate target change to exert a greater effect on the long
bond at higher rates of interest.5
3 Goodfriend (1991) discusses evidence consistent with this view found in Fama (1984),
Fama and Bliss (1987), Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987), Hardouvelis (1988), and Cook and
Hahn (1989).
4 Consider a bond paying nominal interest (i) taxable at rate (τ) when the expected inﬂation
rate is (πe). The real after-tax ex ante return on such a bond is then r = (1 − τ)i − πe, so the
expected inﬂation rate over the life of the bond may be expressed as πe = [i−r/(1−τ)](1−τ).
Woodward (1990) reports market expectations of the after-tax real rate of interest on long-
term bonds using quarterly data on British index-linked gilt-edged securities from 1982:2 to
1989:1. The ex ante post-tax real rate ranged from 1.5 percent to 3.2 percent per annum with a
mean of 2.6 percent.
Assuming investors keep after-tax ex ante rates on long-term government bonds in the United
States and United Kingdom roughly equal, we can set r = 2.6 in the above expression to infer
long-term expected inﬂation in the United States. A tax rate in the United States of 0.2, for exam-
ple, yields πe = [i − 3.2](.8). If we take i as the yield to maturity on a 30-year U.S. government
bond, then πe is the average per annum inﬂation rate expected over the 30-year horizon.
The tax rate in the above expression is the marginal rate that applies to the relevant mar-
ginal investor, e.g., individual, corporate, or foreign. The rate is difﬁcult to determine. Its exact
value, however, is not important for the analysis in the text. The analysis relies on the view
that signiﬁcant changes in the long-term nominal rate primarily reﬂect movements in inﬂation
expectations, a view supported by the relatively narrow range of ex ante post-tax real rates reported
by Woodward.
5 A given federal funds rate target change will exert a greater effect on the long-term bond
rate the shorter the average life of the security as measured by its duration. The duration of a
coupon bond may be thought of as the term to maturity of an equivalent zero coupon bond that
makes the same total payments and has the same yield. The duration of a 30-year coupon bond
selling at par is approximately 1/r, where r is the yield to maturity. See Moore (1989). Thus, the
duration of the 30-year government (coupon) bond discussed in the text is only about 12.5 years
at an interest rate of 8 percent and 7.1 years at a 14 percent interest rate.   
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It is useful to distinguish three sources of interaction between the federal
funds rate and the long-term rate:
Purely Cyclical Funds Rate Policy Actions
The Fed routinely lowers the funds rate in response to cyclical downturns and
raises it in cyclical expansions. I call such policy actions purely cyclical if
they maintain the going trend rate of inﬂation. Even purely cyclical policy
actions exert a pull on longer rates, however, so they are a source of positive
co-movement between the funds rate and the long rate. But because cyclical
actions strongly inﬂuence only the ﬁrst few years of expected future short-
term interest rates, only a relatively small fraction of purely cyclical funds rate
changes are transmitted to the long rate.
Long-Run Inﬂation
Changes in the trend rate of inﬂation are a second source of positive co-
movement between the funds rate and the long rate. The long rate moves
automatically with inﬂation expectations. The funds rate does not, however,
unless the Fed makes it do so. Nevertheless, the Fed often chooses to hold
short-term real rates relatively steady in the presence of rising or falling in-
ﬂation by moving the funds rate up or down to allow for a rising or falling
inﬂation premium. Doing so causes short and long rates to move together.
Aggressive Funds Rate Policy Actions
The Fed occasionally takes particularly aggressive funds rate policy actions to
encourage real growth or to stop and reverse a rising rate of inﬂation. Ag-
gressive actions combine an effect on the long-term real rate with a potential
change in the long-run rate of inﬂation. The real rate effect moves the long
rate in the same direction as the funds rate, while the inﬂation effect moves the
long rate in the opposite direction. Thus the net effect of aggressive actions on
the long rate is somewhat complex.
Consider an aggressive reduction in the funds rate to encourage real growth.
Initially, funds rate actions taken to ﬁght recession pull the long rate down too.
However, excessive easing that raises expected inﬂation can cause the long rate
to reverse direction and begin to rise, even as the Fed continues to push short
rates down. Thus we might expect to see the long rate move in the opposite
direction from the funds rate near cyclical troughs. A funds rate tightening dur-
ing the ensuing recovery exerts two conﬂicting forces. It tends to raise the long
rate by reversing the cyclical funds rate decline, but it also reverses somewhat
the expected rise in inﬂation, tending to lower the long rate. For a relatively
brief recession with little excessive easing, the cyclical funds rate effect would
dominate the inﬂation effect, so the long rate would tend to rise with the funds       
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rate during the recovery. Thus, the long rate would move opposite from the
funds rate for only a few months near a recession trough.
Now consider an aggressive increase in the funds rate intended to bring
down the trend rate of inﬂation. Such a tightening potentially shifts both com-
ponents of the long rate since short rates rise and expected long-run inﬂation
may fall. One expects the ﬁrst effect to dominate initially, however, because
a large aggressive increase in short rates exerts an immediate signiﬁcant up-
ward pull on the long rate, while the public may not yet have conﬁdence in
the disinﬂation. If the Fed persists with sufﬁciently high short-term real rates,
however, inﬂation and real growth eventually slow and the Fed can tentatively
bring rates down somewhat. A declining long rate, at this point, would suggest
that the Fed’s disinﬂation has acquired some credibility.
Inﬂation Scares
I call a signiﬁcant long-rate rise in the absence of an aggressive funds rate
tightening an inﬂation scare since it reﬂects rising expected long-run inﬂation.6
Inﬂation scares are of concern because higher inﬂation, if realized, would re-
duce the efﬁciency of the payments system, with negative consequences for
employment, productivity, and economic growth. Moreover, scares are costly
because they present the Fed with a difﬁcult dilemma. Resisting them requires
the Fed to raise real short rates with potentially depressing effects on business
conditions. Failing to respond promptly, however, can create a crisis of con-
ﬁdence that encourages the higher inﬂation to materialize: workers and ﬁrms
ask for wage and price increases to protect themselves from higher expected
costs. In short, by hesitating, the Fed sets in motion higher inﬂation that it is
then inclined to accommodate with faster money growth. The record of rising
inﬂation and disinﬂation reviewed below contains examples of scares followed
by higher money growth and inﬂation, as well as scares successfully resisted
by the Fed.7
2. A REVIEW OF INTEREST RATE POLICY
This study focuses on the period of inﬂation ﬁghting beginning in October
1979. Nevertheless, I begin my review by brieﬂy describing conditions in the
immediately preceding years. For the most part, data discussed throughout are
shown in Figure 1 and are given in the tables included at the end of the article.
6 Since short maturity rates are anchored to the federal funds rate target, they cannot convey
as clear a signal of inﬂation expectations as the long rate. See Dotsey and King (1986) for an
analysis of the informational implications of interest rate rules.
7 An inﬂation scare may be consistent with either a positive or a negative association between
money or prices, on one hand, and unemployment or real growth on the other, depending on the
nature of the underlying macroshock that sets it off. For example, an investment boom tends to
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Rising Inﬂation: The Late 1970s
Inﬂation was rising gradually in the late 1970s, with rates of 7.3 percent, 8.4
percent, and 8.7 percent in 1977, 1978, and 1979 as measured by fourth quarter
over fourth quarter changes in the GDP deﬂator. The corresponding real GDP
growth rates were 4.4 percent, 6.0 percent, and 0.9 percent. Rising inﬂation
throughout the late 1970s carried the 30-year government bond rate from 7.8
percent in early 1977 to 9.2 percent by September 1979. Over the same period,
the Fed steadily increased the federal funds rate from around 4.7 percent to 11.4
percent, raising short-term real rates from a range between 0 to −2 percent to
between 0 and +2 percent. The negative short-term real rates at the beginning
of the period suggest that initially the Fed was stimulating real growth, though
the steady increase in real short rates represented a modest effort to resist
inﬂation.
Aborted Inﬂation Fighting: October 1979 to July 1980
By the time Paul Volcker became Fed Chairman in August 1979, oil price
increases following the Iranian revolution in November 1978 greatly worsened
the inﬂation outlook. Oil prices were to double by early 1980 and triple by early
1981 from November 1978 levels, and by the fall of 1979 the Fed felt that more
drastic action was needed to ﬁght inﬂation. The announcement on October 6,
1979, of the switch to nonborrowed reserve targeting ofﬁcially opened the
inﬂation-ﬁghting period.
The ﬁrst aggressive policy actions in this period took the monthly average
funds rate from 11.4 percent in September 1979 to 17.6 percent in April 1980.
Cook (1989) reports that only 1 percentage point of this 6 point rise can be
attributed to automatic adjustment. Virtually all of it represented deliberate
policy actions taken by the Fed to increase short-term interest rates. It was
the most aggressive series of actions the Fed had taken in the postwar period
over so short a time, although the 5 percentage point increase from January to
September of 1973 was almost as large.
For its part, the 30-year rate rose sharply from 9.2 percent in September
to a temporary peak of 12.3 percent in March, after which it fell back to 11.4
percent in April. A closer look reveals the sources of this sharp rise in the long
rate. The sharp 2.3 percentage point funds rate jump from September to October
raised the long rate by 0.7 percentage points. The funds rate then held in a range
between 13.2 percent and 14.1 percent through February. January 1980 later
turned out to be an NBER business cycle peak, and evidence of a weakening
economy caused the Fed to pause in its aggressive tightening. But with the
funds rate relatively steady, the long rate jumped sharply by around 2 percent-
age points between December and February, signaling a serious inﬂation scare.
The scare was probably caused in part by the ongoing oil price rises,
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December also playing a role. The   
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Fed’s hesitation to proceed with its tightening, however, probably contributed
to the collapse of conﬁdence. In any case, the Fed reacted with an enormous
3 percentage point increase of the monthly average funds rate in March, only 1
percentage point of which was due to the automatic adjustment. The long rate
hardly moved in response, suggesting that the positive effect on the long rate of
the aggressive tightening was offset by a decline in expected inﬂation. More-
over, the long rate actually came down by 0.9 percentage points in April even
as the Fed pushed the funds rate up another 0.4 percentage points, suggesting
that the Fed had already begun to win credibility for its disinﬂationary policy.
When one considers that business peaked in January, there is reason to
believe that inﬂation would have come down as the recession ran its course in
1980 if the Fed had then sustained its high interest rate policy. The imposi-
tion of credit controls in March, however, forced the Fed to abort that policy.
Schreft (1990) argues persuasively that by encouraging a decline in consumer
spending, the credit control program was largely responsible for the extremely
sharp −9.9 percent annualized decline in real GDP in the second quarter of
1980. Supporting her view is the fact that personal consumption expenditures
accounted for about 80 percent of the decline in real output, more than twice
its average 35 percent contribution in postwar U.S. recessions.
Accompanying the downturn in economic activity was a sharp fall in the
demand for money and bank reserves that, according to Cook (1989), caused a
4.2 percentage point automatic decline of the funds rate from April to July. The
Fed enhanced the automatic easing with judgmental actions, e.g., reducing the
discount surcharge, that reduced the funds rate by an additional 4.3 percentage
points over this period.
The sharp interest rate decline coupled with the lifting of credit controls
in July led to strong 8.4 percent annualized real GDP growth in the fourth
quarter of 1980. Because the credit controls caused the Fed to interrupt its
inﬂation-ﬁghting effort, inﬂation rose through the year from an annual rate of
9.8 percent in the ﬁrst quarter to 10.9 percent in the fourth quarter as measured
by the GDP deﬂator.
Aggressive Disinﬂationary Policy: August 1980 to October 1982
It was clear in late summer and early fall of 1980 that inﬂationary pressures
were as strong as ever. After being pulled down about 1.6 percentage points
by the aggressive funds rate easing from April to June, the 30-year rate rose
by about 40 basis points between June and July as the Fed continued to push
the funds rate down another 40 basis points. The reversal signaled an inﬂation
scare induced by the excessively aggressive easing, and the Fed began an
unprecedented aggressive tightening. Of the roughly 10 percentage point rise
in the monthly average funds rate from July to December 1980, Cook (1989)
attributes only about 3 percentage points to the automatic adjustment. Thus,  
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the run-up of the funds rate to its 19 percent peak in January 1981 marked
a deliberate return to the high interest rate policy. As measured by the GDP
deﬂator, which was rising at nearly a 12 percent annual rate in the ﬁrst quarter
of 1981, real short-term rates were a high 7 percent at that point.
As soon as the funds rate peak had been established, however, very slow
growth in M1 and bank reserves automatically put downward pressure on the
funds rate. According to Cook (1989), about 3.4 percentage points of the 4
percentage point drop in the funds rate between January and March was attribut-
able to the automatic adjustment. Since the automatic adjustment had correctly
signaled weakness in the economy in the second quarter of 1980, the Fed was
initially inclined to let rates fall in early 1981. However, real GDP actually
grew at a 5.6 percent annual rate in the ﬁrst quarter, and when the strength of
the economy became clear, the Fed took deliberate actions to override what
it took to be a false signal that disinﬂation had taken hold. Reversing ﬁeld, it
ran the funds rate back up to 19 percent by June, using a series of deliberate
tightening actions to supplement what Cook (1989) reports would only have
been a 0.8 percentage point automatic funds rate rise.
It was not long before the aggressive disinﬂationary policy began to take
hold. Annualized real GDP growth was −1.7 percent in the second quarter of
1981. The third quarter posted 2.1 percent real growth, but an NBER business
cycle peak was reached in July and real growth fell to −6.2 percent in the fourth
quarter of 1981 and −4.9 percent in the ﬁrst quarter of 1982. Meanwhile, the
quarterly inﬂation rate as measured by the GDP deﬂator fell from 11.8 percent
in the ﬁrst quarter of 1981 to the 4.5 percent range by early 1982.
The Fed brought the funds rate down from 19 percent at the business cycle
peak in July to 13.3 percent in November and held the funds rate in the 13 to
15 percent range until the summer of 1982, when it brought short rates down
another 4 percentage points to around 10 percent. The funds rate reduction
through November 1981 was large in nominal terms, but when one considers
that inﬂation had declined to the 4.5 percent range by early 1982, the funds
rate decline actually represented a 1 or 2 percentage point rise in short-term
real rates. Thus, one should still view policy as aggressively disinﬂationary in
early 1982. As calculated by Cook (1989), automatic adjustments accounted
for only 1 percentage point of the ﬁnal 9 percentage point funds rate decline in
the nonborrowed reserve targeting period, which ended formally in October of
1982. This last great decline should be seen as a deliberate funds rate easing
calculated to achieve a sustained reduction in inﬂation without excessive harm
to real growth.
The long rate provides a picture of the Fed’s progress in reducing the trend
rate of inﬂation. The 30-year rate rose about 5 percentage points from a trough
in June of 1980 to its 14.7 percent peak in October 1981. About 2 percentage
points of that rise represented a reversal of the decline in the second quarter of
1980. The remaining 3 point gain through October 1981 reﬂected a continuing   
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inﬂation scare. The sharp rise in the long rate after the funds rate had reached
its peak in early 1981 probably contributed to the Fed’s inclination to persist
with its 19 percent funds rate until August 1981. Moreover, the discernable
declining trend in the long rate from October 1981 to August 1982 indicated
that the policy was still exerting disinﬂationary pressure. When the Fed ﬁnally
decided to relax its disinﬂationary policy by dropping the funds rate by over
4 percentage points in the summer of 1982, the long rate also fell by around
3.5 percentage points.
We can decompose this last decline in the long rate into a real component
and an inﬂation-expectations component using evidence from earlier in the
aggressive funds rate targeting period. The sharp 2.3 percentage point funds
rate rise from September to October 1979 pulled the long rate up 0.7 percent-
age points; and the sharp 8.6 percentage point funds rate reduction between
April and June 1980 pulled the long rate down 1.6 percentage points. Taking
25 percent as the fraction of aggressive funds rate policy actions transmitted
to the long real rate, about 2.5 percentage points of the 3.5 percentage point
fall in the long rate in the summer of 1982 reﬂected a reduction of inﬂation
expectations.
Establishing Credibility: November 1982 to Spring 1986
Real GDP growth was still poor in the second half of 1982, running −1.8 per-
cent and 0.6 percent in the third and fourth quarters, respectively. Consequently,
the Fed continued to ease after relaxing its disinﬂationary policy, pushing the
monthly average funds rate down to 8.5 percent by February 1983. November
1982 turned out to be an NBER business cycle trough, and real GDP growth
was 2.6 percent in the ﬁrst quarter of 1983. But the Fed kept the funds rate
around 8.6 percent through May while the long rate remained steady at around
10.5 percent. It gradually became clear, however, that a strong recovery had
begun. Real GDP grew at a spectacular 11.3 percent annual rate in the second
quarter of 1983 and at rates of 6.1 percent, 7.0 percent, 7.9 percent, and 5.4
percent in the following four quarters.
The long rate rose from 10.5 percent in May 1983 to 11.8 percent in
August, initiating an inﬂation scare only a year after the Fed had relaxed its
disinﬂationary policy. The Fed reacted by raising the funds rate from 8.6 percent
in May to 9.6 percent by August. Annualized quarterly inﬂation as measured by
the GDP deﬂator was 4.8 percent or below throughout 1983 and 1984 with the
exception of the ﬁrst quarter of 1984, when it was 6 percent. Nevertheless, the
long rate continued its rise in early 1984, moving up from the 11.8 percent level
it had maintained since the previous summer to a 13.4 percent peak in June
1984. Amazingly, this was only about a percentage point short of its October
1981 peak, even though by 1984 inﬂation was 4 or 5 percentage points lower
than in 1981.   
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The Fed tightened in an effort to resist the ongoing inﬂation scare, raising
the funds rate to an 11.6 percent peak in August of 1984. The long rate began
to decline in June 1984, indicating that the scare had been contained. The 7
percent real short rates needed to contain the scare ultimately brought quarterly
real GDP growth down to the more normal 2 to 3 percent range in the second
half of 1984. The Fed then lowered the funds rate rapidly by 3.2 percentage
points from August to December and held it around 8 percent through 1985.
Meanwhile, the long rate fell about 6 percentage points from its June 1984
peak to the mid-7 percent range by the spring of 1986. By then, the long rate
was 3 percentage points below where it had been at the start of the 1983 scare.
The Fed’s containment of the scare apparently made the public conﬁdent of
another 3 percentage point reduction in the trend rate of inﬂation.
Maintaining Credibility: Spring 1986 to Summer 1990
Real GDP growth weakened considerably in the second quarter of 1986 to
−0.3 percent from the strong 5.4 percent rate in the ﬁrst quarter. With inﬂation
appearing to have settled down in the 4 percent range, the Fed moved to
encourage real growth by dropping the funds rate to the mid-6 percent range.
Strong real growth in 1987 was accompanied by still another inﬂation scare in
which the long rate rose 2 full percentage points from around 7.6 percent in
March to 9.6 percent in October.
Although real GDP growth was very strong throughout the year, this time
the Fed responded to the scare with only a relatively modest increase in the
funds rate. As it happened, the scare eased somewhat after the October stock
market crash, although the long rate remained above 8 percent. With real growth
still reasonably strong in 1988, the Fed proceeded to raise the funds rate sharply
from the 6 to 7 percent range in early 1988 to a peak of 9.9 percent in March
1989.
Though there was some evidence of a modest rise in inﬂation in 1988, the
sustained funds rate tightening during the year is unique in that it was under-
taken without a rise in the long rate. A preemptive tightening may have been
needed to reverse the perception that policy had eased permanently following
the stock market crash. At any rate, the result was an increase in credibility
reﬂected in a further decline in the long rate in 1989. Though that fall was
partially reversed in early 1990, a gently declining trend in the long rate was
discernable by then, indicating growing conﬁdence on the part of the public in
the Fed’s commitment to low inﬂation.
The 1990–91 Recession
The period of weak real growth in 1989 ending in an NBER business cycle
peak in July 1990 may have been partly due to the high real short rates.
Temporary oil price increases following the invasion of Kuwait, however, also      
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helped account for the −1.6 percent real growth in the third quarter of 1990,
−3.9 percent real growth in the fourth quarter, and −3.0 percent in the ﬁrst
quarter of 1991.
The Fed responded to the recession by bringing the funds rate down from
slightly above 8 percent in the fall of 1990 to around 3 percent by the fall of
1992. It is remarkable that this sustained easing has not yet caused the long rate
to rise, even though real short rates are now around zero. Real short rates were
also about zero when excessive easing sparked the inﬂation scare in the summer
of 1980, but they were around 4 percent when excessive easing triggered the
summer 1983 scare, and around 3 percent at the time of the scare in the spring
of 1987. The real short-rate ﬂoor at which easy monetary policy becomes ex-
cessive depends on such factors as the unemployment rate, government ﬁscal
policy, and the strength of investment and consumption demand.8 For example,
the depressing effect of the credit control program on consumer spending may
help account for the real rate getting as low as it did in 1980 before triggering a
scare. Long rates, however, may also be more tolerant of aggressive funds rate
easing when the public is more conﬁdent of the Fed’s commitment to maintain
a low trend rate of inﬂation.
3. OBSERVATIONS
The record of interest rate policy reviewed above contains a number of empiri-
cal ﬁndings that are important for interpreting and evaluating monetary policy.
This section summarizes the main ﬁndings in a series of observations.
1. Inﬂation scares appear to be central to understanding the Fed’s management
of short-term interest rates. The gradual funds rate rise from January 1977
to October 1979 was undertaken in an environment of slowly rising long
rates. The sharp long-rate rise in early 1980, during a four-month pause
in the funds rate tightening, was probably an important factor inducing
the Fed to undertake its enormous 3 percentage point tightening in March.
Sharply rising long rates in the ﬁrst nine months of 1981 indicated that the
Fed had yet to win credibility for its disinﬂationary policy, and probably
contributed to the Fed’s maintaining very high real short rates for as long
as it did. On the other hand, the declining long rate from October 1981 to
October 1982 encouraged the Fed to ease policy by indicating the public’s
growing conﬁdence in the disinﬂation.
The serious inﬂation scare set off in the summer of 1983 largely ac-
counts for the run-up of the funds rate to August 1984. The credibility
acquired by the Fed in containing that scare yielded a 3 percentage point
8 See, for example, the discussions in Campbell and Clarida (1987) and Poole (1988).  
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reduction in the long rate that allowed the funds rate to come down too.
There was no inﬂation scare per se when the Fed raised the funds rate in
1988. Nevertheless, that series of actions may be understood as preemp-
tive, taken to reverse a public perception that policy had permanently eased
following the stock market crash. The current funds rate easing has yet to
trigger a rise in the long rate, but the possibility of an inﬂation scare has
probably limited the funds rate decline somewhat.
2. One might reasonably have expected the aggressive disinﬂationary policy
actions taken in late 1979 to reduce long-term interest rate volatility by
quickly stabilizing long-term inﬂation expectations at a low rate. Yet the
reverse was true initially. Long rates turned out to be surprisingly volatile
due to a combination of particularly aggressive funds rate movements and
inﬂation scares. Amazingly, it took until 1988 for the unusual long-rate
volatility to disappear.
3. One might also have expected the aggressive funds rate actions beginning
in October 1979 to be accompanied by opposite movements in the long
rate. Again, the result was just the reverse. The aggressive actions moved
the long rate in the same direction, apparently inﬂuencing the long rate
primarily through their effect on shorter maturity rates. Only at funds rate
peaks and troughs did the long rate move in the opposite direction from
the funds rate. The long rate appeared to be inﬂuenced by a change in
expected inﬂation only after sustained aggressive funds rate actions.
4. The long rate reached its peak in October 1981, indicating that it took two
years for policy to reverse the rise in the trend rate of inﬂation. It would be
a mistake, however, to conclude that acquiring credibility necessarily takes
so long. On the contrary, a close look reveals that the long rate had already
turned down in April 1980 while the funds rate was still rising, suggesting
that some credibility had been won by then. Credibility might even have
been achieved sooner if the Fed had not hesitated temporarily between
December 1979 and February 1980 to continue the aggressive funds rate
tightening begun in October. In any case, the credit control program inter-
rupted the disinﬂationary policy actions in May 1980 and high interest rates
were restored fully only in early 1981. The automatic adjustment feature of
the nonborrowed reserve operating procedure then caused a sharp decline
in the funds rate between January and March of 1981 that was only fully
reversed by June. Thus, three unfortunate interruptions account for the
delay in the Fed’s acquisition of credibility for its disinﬂationary policy.
5. Interestingly enough, the long rate was roughly in the same 8 percent
range in the early 1990s as it was in the late 1970s, in spite of the 4 or 5
percentage point reduction in the inﬂation rate. Apparently, investors then
perceived the 7 to 9 percent inﬂation rate as temporarily high, while, if
anything, they perceive the current 3 to 4 percent rate as a bit below trend.
The slowly declining long rate in the current period is indicative of the      
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steady acquisition of credibility, but the high long rate indicates a lingering
lack of conﬁdence in the Fed.
6. The Fed appears to have had remarkable latitude to push the federal funds
rate down in the recent recession and recovery without triggering a rise
in the long rate. On three occasions when trying to encourage real growth
in the 1980s (summer 1980, summer 1983, and spring 1987) it could not
push the funds rate more than 1 or 2 percentage points below the long
rate before triggering an inﬂation scare; yet it pushed the funds rate 4
percentage points below the long rate in 1992.
The greater ﬂexibility to reduce short rates evident in the current re-
cession is reminiscent of that in early postwar recessions when the Fed
presumably had more credibility. The funds rate was pushed almost 3
percentage points below the long rate during the August 1957–April 1958
recession before the long rate began to rise. It was pushed more than 2
percentage points below the long rate in the April 1960–February 1961
recession without much of a rise in the long rate.9
7. The preceding observation suggests an attractive argument in favor of a
congressional mandate for price stability. By reducing the risk of inﬂation
scares, such a mandate would free the funds rate to react more aggressively
to unemployment in the short run. Thus, a mandate for price stability would
not only help eliminate inefﬁciencies associated with long-run inﬂation, it
would add ﬂexibility to the funds rate that might improve countercyclical
stabilization policy as well.10
4. CONCLUSION
The article used institutional knowledge of Fed policy procedures, simple eco-
nomic theory, and the inﬂation scare concept to analyze and interpret interest
rate policy as practiced by the Fed since 1979. It focused on the primary policy
problem during the period: the acquisition and maintenance of credibility for
the commitment to low inﬂation. We saw that the Fed might have acquired
credibility for its disinﬂation relatively quickly in early 1980 had it been able
to sustain high interest rates then. After all, long-term rates were roughly equal
to the inﬂation rate in 1979, indicating that the public believed inﬂation was
only temporarily high at the time. Unfortunately, a series of interruptions de-
layed the actual disinﬂation for two years, probably raising the cost in terms
of lost output of acquiring credibility.
9 Kessel (1965) contains a good description and analysis of the historical relation between
long and short rates over the business cycle.
10 Black (1990) discusses the beneﬁts of price stability. Hetzel (1990, 1992) discusses a
proposal that the U.S. Treasury issue indexed bonds to provide a better indicator of long-run
inﬂation expectations.  
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Only a year after relaxing its disinﬂationary policy in 1982, the Fed’s cred-
ibility was again challenged with a serious inﬂation scare that carried the long
rate up from 10.5 percent to 13.4 percent. It took 11 months and 7 percent real
short rates to contain the scare, indicating how fragile the Fed’s credibility was
in 1983 and 1984. The long-rate decline to the 7.5 percent range by the spring
of 1986 reﬂected a big gain in credibility. Yet the Fed was tested by another
scare in 1987 that ended with the stock market crash. The crash itself, however,
then set in motion expectations of excessive easing that the Fed resisted with a
3 percentage point funds rate rise in 1988 and 1989, a tightening that probably
weakened real growth somewhat in 1989 and 1990.
Reviewing the policy record makes one understand how fragile the Fed’s
credibility is and how potentially costly it is to maintain. Even after inﬂation
had stabilized at around 4 percent in 1983, inﬂation scares and the Fed’s reac-
tion to them were associated with signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in real growth. With
that in mind, one cannot help but appreciate the potential value of a congres-
sional mandate for price stability that would help the Fed establish a credible
commitment to low inﬂation. In fact, there is evidence that an interest rate
policy assisted by such a mandate would work well. The Bundesbank and the
Bank of Japan follow interest rate policies resembling the Fed’s and yet, for the
most part, they have achieved better macroeconomic performance. Perhaps it is
because they each enjoy a stronger mandate for price stability than does the Fed.      
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Table 1 Quarterly Changes in Real GDP and
GDP Implicit Price Deﬂator, 1977:1–1992:4
















1 6.0 6.1 1 2.7 4.9
2 6.9 8.4 2 3.2 3.0
3 5.7 7.4 3 5.2 2.6
4 −0.8 7.3 4 2.3 3.9
1978 1986
1 2.8 5.7 1 5.4 2.1
2 13.5 10.7 2 −0.3 2.1
3 3.1 8.3 3 2.3 2.9
4 4.8 8.8 4 1.3 3.3
1979 1987
1 0.1 8.6 1 3.0 3.3
2 0.4 8.4 2 5.1 2.9
3 2.5 9.6 3 4.0 3.3
4 0.7 8.1 4 5.9 3.6
1980 1988
1 1.7 9.8 1 2.6 3.6
2 −9.9 9.6 2 4.3 4.4
3 0.1 10.0 3 2.5 5.1
4 8.3 10.9 4 3.9 3.9
1981 1989
1 5.6 11.8 1 3.2 5.4
2 −1.7 7.5 2 1.8 4.6
3 2.1 9.6 3 0.0 3.8
4 −6.2 8.8 4 1.5 3.7
1982 1990
1 −4.9 4.5 1 2.8 4.4
2 1.6 5.5 2 1.0 4.8
3 −1.8 4.4 3 −1.6 4.7
4 0.6 3.4 4 −3.9 3.9
1983 1991
1 2.6 4.8 1 −3.0 5.3
2 11.3 2.8 2 1.7 3.5
3 6.1 4.2 3 1.2 2.4
4 7.0 4.2 4 0.6 2.4
1984 1992
1 7.9 6.0 1 2.9 3.1
2 5.4 4.1 2 1.5 2.7
3 2.2 4.5 3 3.4 2.0
4 2.7 2.6 4 3.8 1.7
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.    
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